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Abstract 
 
This paper lays out some of the basic concepts surrounding financial inclusion, including access 
to banking, digital payments and financial literacy, as well as markets for health insurance, crop 
insurance, agricultural credit, small firm finance, and microcredit/ microfinance. It goes on to 
discuss various empirical and institutional studies of these dimensions of financial inclusion in 
the context of developing countries. The paper then outlines several recent studies for India 
sponsored by the International Growth Centre, which pertain to these specific aspects of financial 
inclusion. Finally, the paper draws lessons for policy-making and future research directions. 
Important considerations that emerge from the overview are the significance of social and 
economic context, the need to consider behavioral biases connected to situations involving time 
and risk, the interaction of different dimensions of financial inclusion, the importance of details 
of policy design, and the limited understanding we still have of many of the factors underlying 
the functioning of financial markets. 
.
                                                 
* I am grateful to Eilin Francis and Arshad Mirza for valuable research assistance, and to Dilip Mookherjee for 
incisive comments on an earlier draft. Sole responsibility for shortcomings is mine. 
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Introduction 
Financial development is an obvious component of overall economic development, as well as 
playing a role in driving growth.1 Studying the role of financial development in economic 
growth has gone from measuring it in terms of a single number such as the ratio of bank credit to 
an overall measure of economic activity (typically GDP) to considering the different dimensions 
of the concept. A typical decomposition of the concept of financial development considers depth, 
access, efficiency and stability (Cihak et al., 2012).2 Financial depth corresponds to the 
dimension captured in measures such as credit-GDP ratios. Financial access is essentially the 
same as financial inclusion, and the latter term has become more common (World Bank, 2014). 
The 2014 World Bank conceptualization of financial inclusion parallels basic ideas of financial 
depth: “the proportion of individuals and firms that use financial services” (p. 1). Subsequently, 
the Bank has developed a more elaborate definition: 
Financial inclusion means that individuals and businesses have access to useful and 
affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – transactions, payments, 
savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustainable way. 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview#1) 
This definition highlights the different aspects of financial services that are ultimately what make 
finance an important part of the economy. As the web site notes, “Access to a transaction 
account is a first step toward broader financial inclusion since it allows people to store money, 
and send and receive payments. A transaction account can also serve as a gateway to other 
financial services…” There are several implicit assumptions in highlighting financial inclusion in 
this manner, in particular, the notion that the aforementioned financial services are not available 
to a set of people that is socially optimal, either in an instrumental sense of maximizing 
aggregate welfare (including social concerns for reducing inequality) and economic growth, or in 
                                                 
1 Recent contributions to the enormous literature on the connection between financial development and growth 
include Beck et al., (2007), Law and Singh (2014), Aizenman et al., (2015) and Arcand et al. (2015). 
2 Sahay et al. (2015) consider depth, access and efficiency as components of financial development, and consider 
financial and economic stability separately. These analyses also distinguish between financial markets and financial 
institutions. Cihak et al. (2012), following earlier work on constructing indices of financial development, discuss 
various measures of access, including bank accounts per 1,000 individuals and percentage of firms with lines of 
credit (institutions), as well as percentage of market capitalization outside the 10 largest companies (markets), along 
with several other candidate variables. Sahay et al. (2015) use similar measures. 
2 
 
a broader sense of promoting rights and capabilities for all human beings (Sen, 1999). The 
possible reasons for suboptimality are taken up later in this paper. 
The World Bank web site on financial inclusion goes on to remind readers of the beneficial 
ripple effects of financial access, beginning with basic formal transaction accounts. These 
benefits include lower transaction costs for daily economic activities, the ability to plan for 
longer-term needs, and the opportunity to create buffers for unexpected emergencies. For the 
better-off in both advanced and developing countries, both financial access and its benefits are 
taken relatively for granted, although the limits and challenges of access are much more severe in 
poorer economies or regions.3  
Other discussions of financial inclusion have different emphases, but with similar scope. For 
example, the introduction to a collection (Cull et al., 2013) of empirical analyses of financial 
inclusion begins by highlighting microcredit as being symbolic of growing financial inclusion, 
though it goes on to note savings, transfers and insurance as other important services. While 
many such financial services are missing or barely provided in poorer countries such as India, the 
challenge of providing microcredit is just one example of pervasive credit market imperfections 
that hamper development. These imperfections are apparent in the very limited access of most 
individuals in, say, India to formal credit markets, and the large disparities in borrowing costs 
between formal and informal credit markets. 
Dilip Mookherjee4 emphasizes two other important aspects of financial inclusion in the context 
of India. The first is the necessity of wider financial inclusion to improve the efficiency and 
targeting of government welfare programs. For example, transfers that can be made directly to 
citizen bank accounts can help to eliminate corrupt and inefficient intermediaries.5 Second, 
financial inclusion has a much wider role as an instrument of reducing corruption and terrorism, 
by enabling better monitoring and regulation of financial transactions. In both these cases, 
innovation through the use of digital technology is a key component of implementing change.6 
Cull et al. (2013) also note the importance of technological and product innovation in improving 
inclusion. Karmakar et al. (2011), in assessing financial inclusion in India, begin by emphasizing 
the need to expand the reach of formal financial institutions such as banks, as a channel for 
access to a range of financial services. The role of technological innovation in bringing down the 
costs of service provision is again highlighted, as is the need for financial counseling: indeed, the 
                                                 
3 The discussion of the benefits of financial inclusion ties in with the detailed micro-level account of the lives of 
poor people in Banerjee and Duflo (2011). 
4 Personal communication, February 2017. 
5 In particular, Muralidharan et al. (2016) evaluate the impact of biometric payments infrastructure to make social 
welfare payments in Andhra Pradesh. This study shows that payments through biometrically authenticated accounts 
led to faster, and more predictable payments with a 47% reduction in reduction in leakage of funds between the 
government and target beneficiaries. 
6 As recent developments in India illustrate, addressing better targeting of government programs and control of 
corruption are important parts of the government’s economic strategy. These issues are discussed further in the 
conclusion. 
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behavioral and other demand side aspects of financial inclusion deserve as much attention as 
technological and supply side approaches. 
Karlan and Morduch (2009) provided a major survey of “Access to Finance,” which while 
several years old now, represents the most comprehensive academic review of the topic. They 
pointed out that research in the area had already gone well beyond the initial focus on 
microcredit for investment by small entrepreneurs. The authors discuss new credit mechanisms 
and devices that help households manage cash flows, save, and cope with risk. In this context, 
they consider issues of contract design, product innovation, regulatory policy, and bottom-line 
economic and social impacts. The survey also relates the empirical evidence to theoretical 
concepts rooted in behavioral economics and to the use of randomized evaluation methods. Such 
randomized trials are highlighted as particularly important in the testing of potential innovations 
in financial products and services, and in the institutional and technological contexts in which 
they are delivered. Karlan and Morduch ultimately emphasize the importance of attention to 
detail in finding workable solutions to lack of financial access, a natural conclusion when trying 
to reach marginal populations that are not natural sources of profit for sellers of financial 
products and services. 
Aggarwal and Klapper (2013) build on Karlan and Morduch’s earlier survey, and organize their 
discussion around various barriers to financial inclusion, as well as policies to overcome these 
barriers. Among the barriers they highlight are time and financial costs of opening and 
maintaining bank accounts, as well as the cost of meeting documentation requirements (which 
may be effectively infinite if the required documentation is not possible). They discuss ways of 
reducing these costs, which can include regulatory policy changes, acceleration of adoption of 
digital technology-based mechanisms, institutional innovations such as the use of bank agents, 
or, typically, some mix of all three of these approaches. 
A still more recent, though relatively brief, survey is that of Karlan et al. (2016). Despite a title 
that refers to digital financial services, the scope of the paper is on financial inclusion more 
broadly. It provides one more set of references to research in the area, as well as its own attempt 
to distill lessons from existing studies. Echoing themes in the two earlier surveys, the authors 
emphasize the challenges of market imperfections and deviations from fully rational behavior in 
efforts to increase financial access. At the same time, they draw optimistic conclusions from 
empirical studies about the potential of digital technologies and of savings products to provide 
measurable benefits, while they indicate that areas such as microcredit and insurance present 
greater difficulties for successful innovation. 
The foregoing discussion provides only a flavor of the enormous literature on financial inclusion, 
and the mixed results of a range of empirical studies. The current paper does not substitute for or 
supersede these surveys of our knowledge, but builds on them. The rest of this paper is organized 
as follows. The next section provides an overview of some of the research on various aspects of 
financial inclusion, and what we can learn from it. This review includes research from a variety 
of developing countries, including India, though it is far from exhaustive – an impossible task 
given the size of the literature on various aspects of financial inclusion. The third section 
considers in more detail several studies done specifically for India, and brings out the particular 
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lessons of these analyses. The focus of this paper is on studies conducted under the sponsorship 
of the International Growth Centre, although these are put in the context of the broader literature 
where possible. The fourth and final section concludes by summarizing what we know and 
perhaps do not know, with the latter being a guide to possible future research and analysis. In 
this concluding section, we return to the themes brought up in this introduction, including the 
lessons highlighted by the various surveys discussed above. A key theme of the paper, in line 
with those previous summaries, is that succeeding in the various goals associated with promoting 
financial inclusion requires careful attention to detail with respect to institutions, markets and 
human behavior, and this in turn requires targeted and well-designed research. However, the 
focus on India in the current paper allows for some potentially more targeted policy 
recommendations, as well as specific research directions. 
 
Overview of Research 
This section reviews some of the literature on financial inclusion, with a focus on developing 
countries. After considering a few general analyses of financial inclusion, it turns to specific 
dimensions of inclusion, including access to banking, microcredit and microfinance, agricultural 
credit for small farmers, credit for micro, small and medium enterprises, micro-insurance for 
farmers, health insurance for the poor, and payments technologies. On the demand side, several 
papers that discuss financial literacy are considered. Finally, the behavioral aspects of demand 
for financial services, including possible distortions in assessing intertemporal tradeoffs, which 
are implicit in many of the studies of specific kinds of financial services, are discussed more 
explicitly. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2013) summarize a public data set that measures the financial 
behavior of adults in 148 countries.7 They use it to benchmark financial inclusion, and document 
the most important barriers to bank use, such as the cost of opening account and the need for 
documentation of identity, residence and so on. Sarma and Pais (2011) analyze cross section data 
from several dozen countries to study the factors associated with financial inclusion. They find 
that levels of human development and financial inclusion are positively correlated. More 
specifically, lower income inequality, higher literacy levels and better physical and 
communication infrastructure are all associated with greater financial inclusion.  
Several chapters in Cull et al. (2012) provide overviews of the state of global knowledge of 
financial inclusion. Chapter 2 reports on a joint McKinsey-New York University project that 
parallels and extends data efforts by World Bank and IMF teams (see footnote 2) to estimate the 
number of adults in different countries and regions who are “unbanked.” This work also shows 
that many of the poor do use formal financial services, suggesting that there is scope for greater 
inclusion: poverty by itself need not be an insurmountable barrier. Chapters 3 through 5 in Cull 
et al. (2012) examine another data source: FinScope surveys, conducted in a dozen countries, 
                                                 
7 This paper is based on the Global Findex Database, which is the world’s most comprehensive database on 
financial inclusion. Over 100 indicators covered by this database can be accessed at the following site: 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/. 
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primarily in Africa. These surveys collect detailed product-level information about the use of 
financial services, as well as demographic information. Together, the information on usage and 
individual characteristics provides some insight into the possible barriers to financial inclusion 
along different dimensions.8 
Karmakar et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive account of the challenges of financial inclusion 
in India. They identify institutional and resource constraints, and discuss targeting efforts that 
have focused on rural populations, women’s groups, tribal areas, or combinations of these. They 
consider the different dimensions of financial services, including transactions, savings, credit and 
insurance, and possible institutional and technological innovations, including digital tools for 
identification, payments, and storage. The strengths of these authors’ analysis are in providing a 
fairly comprehensive account of numerous past and current policy initiatives that intersect with 
the various dimensions of financial inclusion, both on the demand side and the supply side. The 
discussion conveys a broad sense of the challenges encountered in policymaking and 
implementation, but since there is no engagement with the empirical academic literature on 
financial inclusion, the normative recommendations in this analysis can be seen as lacking a firm 
enough basis for specific policy initiatives. 
Banking 
Turning to analytical studies of specific dimensions of financial inclusion, we begin with 
banking, in keeping with the earlier observation that access to a transaction account can serve as 
a foundation or gateway for broader access to financial services. In thinking about banking, one 
can conceptualize it broadly, to include institutional variations such as post office accounts, and 
technology-enabled innovations such as agent banking. Two studies from India provide positive 
evidence that targeting bank access can have positive impacts. Burgess and Pande (2005) 
examine the social banking program introduced after India’s bank nationalization in 1969. By 
1990, roughly 30,000 rural locations with no prior formal credit and savings institutions received 
a bank. Using panel data for 16 states over 1961 - 2000, with information about the number of 
bank branches, rural credit and saving shares, and poverty and wage estimates, the authors show 
that branch expansion was associated with reductions in rural poverty. In a closely related 
analysis, Burgess, Wong and Pande (2005) found that national policy that caused banks to open 
relatively more branches in less financially-developed states, and to expansion into rural 
unbanked locations, reduced poverty across Indian states. They also argued that enforcement of 
directed bank lending increased bank borrowing among the poor, in particular, for low-caste and 
tribal groups.  
The Burgess-Pande findings were tempered by a subsequent analysis of a similar period: Kochar 
(2011) used district-level data for India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, and took account of 
potentially confounding correlations of two sources of credit expansion at that time. She found 
evidence of increasing inequality, with the non-poor benefiting more from bank branch 
                                                 
8 The surveys are tailored to individual countries, making global lessons difficult to extract, but the only non-
African country in these surveys is Pakistan, possibly a useful comparator for India. 
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expansion than did the poor.9 However, using later data, Young (2015) highlighted several 
positive impacts of expanding bank access on economic activity, using a well-structured causal 
analysis, thus providing the strongest evidence of the benefits of bank expansion in India. 
In a much more micro-level study, Somville and Vandewalle (2015) conducted a field 
experiment in rural India to study the effect on savings of identical weekly payments on a bank 
account (treatment group) or in cash (control group). They found a large treatment effect, with 
savings increasing by over 100 percent within three months, with the effect being persistent. 
Villagers given cash, on the other hand, did not save more in other assets, but increased 
consumption, suggesting that having a bank account can have a net positive impact on total 
savings. 
On the other hand, Prina (2015) found more limited effects of having bank accounts. In this 
study, female household heads in Nepal were given access to bank accounts with no fees. The 
impacts on income, aggregate expenditures, and assets were too imprecisely estimated to draw 
definite conclusions although there was evidence of a reallocation of expenditures across 
categories, and a higher ability of households to cope with shocks. Finally, Dupas et al. (2016) 
experimentally tested the impact of expanding access to basic bank accounts in three countries 
(Uganda, Malawi, and Chile). While the number of deposits increased, survey data showed no 
clearly discernible effects on savings or any downstream outcomes.  
Such studies suggest that policies merely focused on expanding access to basic accounts are not 
guaranteed to improve outcomes, and that there are other factors that influence success and 
failure, and which need to be identified. On the other hand, the work of Young (2015) suggests 
that, even if mechanisms are not fully observed, and having bank accounts is not an automatic 
benefit for many of the poor, the overall impacts of bank expansion can be identified in increased 
economic activity. 
Microcredit/ Microfinance 
Microfinance and microcredit have received disproportionate attention as vehicles for providing 
needed access to funds for the poor. Key ideas behind these efforts include pooling of funds, risk 
sharing and joint monitoring and liability. Target populations, even if they have bank accounts, 
would almost certainly not qualify for traditional bank loans. Many might use “informal” 
financial services of moneylenders, with the potential of being trapped in unsustainable debt 
situations. Of course, it is now recognized that microfinance is not a magic bullet for providing 
access to credit for the poor, but an enormous body of empirical research provides an 
understanding of how the institution works in different contexts. 
By now, several meta-analyses are also available. For example, Ahlin, Lin and Maio (2011) 
collected data on 373 MFIs and merged it with country-level economic and institutional data to 
                                                 
9 In contrast, a cross-country study by Anson et al. (2013) suggests that post office savings schemes tend to be of 
greater benefit to the relatively poor, even though post offices may not have full bank status, as is the case in India. 
Post office savings accounts in India can also be used to make government welfare payments, as was discussed in 
the introduction.  
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provide evidence for complementarity between MFI performance and that of the broader 
economy. Van Rooyen, Stewart and De Wet (2012) systematically reviewed the evidence of the 
impacts of micro-credit and micro-savings on poor people in sub-Saharan Africa. They 
considered impacts on income, savings, expenditure, and the accumulation of assets, as well as 
non-financial outcomes including health, nutrition, food security, education, child labor, 
women’s empowerment, housing, job creation, and social cohesion. Their conclusion was that 
microfinance has mixed impacts on the livelihoods of the poor. 
Many recent studies of microfinance have used randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Banerjee, 
Karlan and Zinman (2015), provide an introduction and review for six randomized evaluations of 
microcredit and conclude that there is a “consistent pattern of modestly positive, but not 
transformative, effects.” One of the studies in this collection (Banerjee et al., 2015) reports on an 
RCT conducted in Hyderabad, using random selection of areas for opening of a branch of a 
microfinance institution (Spandana). In the treatment areas, households were 8.8 percentage 
points more likely to have a microcredit loan, but there were no significant development 
outcomes in areas such as health, education, and women’s empowerment. The households with 
access to credit were not more likely to start new business, but they did invest more in their 
existing businesses. Finally, there was no effect on average monthly expenditure per capita. 
Other studies have been able to analyze large-scale government initiatives, such as the Thai 
Million Baht Village MFI program. Kaboski and Townsend (2011, 2012) used pre- and post-
program panel data and quasi-experimental cross-village variation in credit per household. They 
find that the village MFI funds increased total short-term credit, consumption, agricultural 
investment, and income, but seemed to lead to decreased overall asset growth.  
Many other evaluative studies have been done, sometimes with specialized foci. Tsai et al. 
(2016) examined the impact of an RCT-type microsavings intervention on reducing violence 
against women engaged in sex work in Mongolia. Microsavings participation did not 
significantly impact women’s risk in this case. Cull et al. (2016) consider the financial 
sustainability of the microfinance business model and conclude that subsidies, while common, 
may not always be necessary. D’Espallier et al. (2013) used a database extracted from annual 
accounting statements provided by the Microfinance Information Exchange (MixMarket), to 
argue that MFIs that do not depend on subsidies are still successful as social ventures. The 
absence of subsidies is not necessarily associated with profit orientation, and unsubsidized MFIs 
include non-profit organizations. Fafchamps et al. (2014) performed an RCT in urban Ghana to 
compare how micro-entrepreneurs use cash and in-kind grants, and find that capital coming 
directly into the business sticks there, but not cash. Cull et al. (2011) show that profit-oriented 
microfinance institutions respond to regulatory supervision by maintaining profit rates but 
curtailing outreach to women and to customers who are more costly to reach. On the other hand, 
institutions with a weaker commercial focus reduce profitability but maintain outreach.  
Studies have also been done to check the robustness of earlier claims. In particular, Roodman 
and Morduch (2009) replicate and reanalyze an influential study of microcredit impacts on poor 
households in Bangladesh. That study was celebrated for showing that microcredit reduces 
poverty, but the re-analysis shows that the original results on poverty reduction disappear after 
8 
 
dropping outliers, or, similarly, when using an estimation method that is robust to such outliers. 
One can conclude that, even in microfinance, an area of financial inclusion where significant 
research has been carried out, there is much more to be learned about the factors that influence 
the success of such efforts. 
Small Firm Finance 
Research on microfinance overlaps with analyses of small firm finance, since the latter can 
include micro-entrepreneurs. Studies examine information constraints as well as credit 
constraints. De Mel et al. (2011) examine the role of information through an RCT in Sri Lanka. 
The intervention was designed to improve access to credit among high-return microenterprises 
by providing information about the microfinance loan product, along with a reduction in the 
number of personal guarantors required for these loans, but without subsidizing interest rates or 
requiring group lending. The outcomes suggest that information alone is unlikely to be enough to 
efficiently improve access. Dupas and Robinson (2013) use an RCT to identify significant 
barriers to savings and investment in rural Kenya. Randomly selected individuals were given free 
access to non-interest-bearing bank accounts among two types of self-employed individuals: 
female market vendors and men working as bicycle taxi drivers. Despite large withdrawal fees, a 
substantial share of market women used the accounts, were able to save more, and increased 
their productive investment and private expenditures. On the other hand, for the men there was 
no effect.10 Karlan et al. (2015) experimented with providing consulting and financial capital to 
microenterprise tailors in Ghana. These infusions changed investment and business practices. 
However, these changes did not translate to significant changes in profit and were not sustained 
in the long run. 
A very large literature examines financing constraints for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
more generally, particularly in developing countries. Beck (2007) surveys empirical research 
along these lines, showing that SMEs are more constrained by financing and other institutional 
obstacles than are large firms, with this situation being made worse by weaknesses in the 
financial systems of many developing countries. An example of such studies is that of Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006). Using cross-country panel data, they find that financial and institutional 
development affect SMEs’ growth, and that SMEs are credit constrained, so that greater access 
to external finance can level the playing field between firms of different sizes. Another cross-
country study, Love and Pería (2015), finds that greater bank competition improves firms' access 
to finance. An alternative hypothesis, that low competition improves access because it allows 
banks to internalize the investment in building firm-specific relationships, is rejected in this 
study. 
Country-specific studies of small firm financing constraints find similar types of results. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2008) use data from a directed lending program in India to show that firms 
in that country are credit constrained. De and Singh (2014) analyze a unique dataset that 
combines panel data of reported financial information for a sample of SMEs in India with data 
from a survey of the same firms regarding the role of relationships in supply of inter-firm credit. 
                                                 
10 Hence, this analysis also connects with studies of banking access, discussed earlier. 
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They find that firms that are unsuccessful in generating internal funds or bank loans appear to 
have better access to relationship-based credit, but the latter is also rationed. In a similar vein, 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that Chinese private sector firms that have access to formal finance 
grow faster while firms that rely on informal finance do not. 
Agricultural Credit 
Credit to farmers occupies a special place in developing countries. The importance of food 
production and the size of the agricultural sector in many countries make agricultural credit 
politically and economically more salient than credit for other kinds of products and services. 
India is an important illustration of these statements, with loans to farmers and forgiveness of 
those loans being tied to electoral considerations (e.g., Cole, 2009). On the other hand, there is 
also evidence that small and marginal farmers still depend on informal lenders, and this can 
contribute to agrarian distress in some cases (e.g., Singh, 2012; Gill, 2016). 
Micro-studies of loans to farmers suggest that there are inefficiencies in the allocation and use of 
agricultural credit. A study of 300 farmers in Nigeria (Oboh and Ekpebu, 2011) finds delays in 
disbursing bank loans as well as considerable diversion of loans to non-farm purposes. Rahman 
(2011) finds that farm credit in Bangladesh may be inefficiently and insufficiently allocated, 
especially in the context of a positive correlation between the credit and output. Studies for India 
(e.g., Sharma and Kumawat, 2014) and Pakistan (e.g., Mehmood et al., 2012) also document 
similar situations: loans are made and monitored inefficiently, so even though credit is rationed, 
increasing its supply may not be welfare improving in the absence of institutional improvements 
such as better targeting and monitoring. 
Farmers’ Insurance 
Insurance for farmers has been receiving increasing attention in developing countries, 
representing an important new area of experiments in financial inclusion. Weather insurance and 
crop or livestock insurance represent potentially significant ways of protecting small and 
marginal farmers from distress. For example, Nair (2010) uses micro data from the Agriculture 
Insurance Company of India, to argue that weather insurance is market-based and financially 
sustainable, more so than yield-based insurance. Cole et al. (2014) examine the market for 
rainfall insurance purchases by rural farming households in Gujarat. Demand was highly 
sensitive to payouts being made in a household's village in the most recent year: a payout of Rs. 
1,000 increased the probability households purchase insurance in the next year by 25-50 percent, 
perhaps suggesting a trust effect. The observations of Gine (2009) complement some of these 
results, noting the problem of correlation of rainfall and macroeconomic conditions, and the need 
to make rapid payouts to liquidity-constrained farmers, in order for the insurance to be 
effective.11 
Issues of price sensitivity are explored in the context of livestock insurance in Ethiopia by 
Takahashi et al. (2016). They find that randomly distributed learning kits improve subjects’ 
                                                 
11 See also Gine, Townsend and Vickery (2008) for earlier evidence of the Indian experience. 
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knowledge of the products but do not lead to greater insurance uptake. On the other hand, 
reduced price due to randomly distributed discount coupons has an immediate, positive impact 
on uptake, without dampening subsequent period demand. The interaction of credit and 
insurance is analyzed in Karlan et al. (2011), trying to address a key question for development: 
does risk inhibit investment? They conducted an RCT in rural Ghana, and offered the treatment 
groups of farmers loans that forgave 50 percent of the loan if crop prices dropped below a 
threshold price. A control group was offered a standard loan product at the same interest rate. 
Surprisingly, the indemnity component had little impact on uptake or other outcomes. 
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) also expresses some pessimism about agricultural insurance based 
on weather indices, using both conceptual arguments and a review of the empirical experience. 
In particular, he points out that credit and cash constraints for poor farmers make it difficult for 
them to purchase insurance in advance of the harvest.  
However, a second set of field experiments from Ghana (Karlan et al., 2014) provides much 
more positive evidence of the benefits of access to agricultural insurance. The authors conducted 
several experiments in which farmers were randomly assigned to receive cash grants, grants of 
(or opportunities to purchase) rainfall index insurance, or a combination of the two. The 
observed demand for this insurance was strong, and insurance led to significantly larger 
agricultural investment as well as riskier production choices. These results indicate that 
uninsured catastrophic risk can be a binding constraint to farmers’ investment. There was also 
evidence of social network effects and overweighting recent events, suggesting that careful 
design of policies and financial education are both needed in implementing such innovations in 
financial products.12 One can also see from comparing the outcomes of different studies that 
more detailed and specific research is needed in this dimension of financial inclusion as well. 
Health Insurance 
Health insurance for the poor represents a dimension of financial inclusion that intersects with 
much larger concerns about the universal provision of health care. While many industrial 
countries provide universal publicly funded health care, others, most notably the United States, 
do not, with exclusion disproportionately affecting the less well-off. The centrality of health to 
people’s lives also makes it an exceptionally emotive subject. The financial aspect enters health 
care because of its potentially high costs, and developing countries obviously face more stringent 
constraints. In such cases, health insurance programs for the poor are meant to increase access to 
health care when the public delivery system is unable to do so effectively. 
One approach to inclusion is through community-based health insurance schemes: essentially a 
form of mutual insurance. For example, a study for Senegal (Jutting, 2003) suggests that these 
can extend access to health care, although the poorest of the poor are still excluded. A study of 
community-based insurance for China (Wang et al., 2005) finds that the benefits of the insurance 
are skewed toward richer participants, highlighting the difficulties and the importance of proper 
                                                 
12 A recent review of the evidence on microinsurance (Platteau et al., 2017) identifies price, quality, limited trust in 
the insurer, and liquidity constraints as factors limiting demand, along with lack of understanding of the products. 
See also De Bock and Gelade (2012) and Matul et al. (2013). 
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targeting and design. In general, qualitative case studies across countries suggest that micro-
insurance for health care is a complex undertaking with significant challenges (McCord, 2001).13 
India has seen significant recent efforts to develop health insurance programs for the poor, and 
many studies of these efforts. Palacios et al. (2011) is a collection of such studies with a great 
deal of institutional detail, including discussing some of the problems of implementation. A 
study by Nandi et al. (2013) carefully examines the determinants of enrolment in the new health 
insurance schemes.14 Selvaraj and Karan (2012) argue that publicly funded health insurance 
schemes with private provision do not work. They argue against involving the private sector at 
all, their concerns being that private providers will cherry-pick, and that there are high 
administrative and other costs associated with private sector involvement. On the other hand, 
Ravi and Bergkvist (2015) posit a different conclusion: allowing for the length of time of 
operation of publicly financed health insurance schemes (PFHISs) reveals impacts that are more 
positive than found by Selvraj and Karan. However, two other studies of Indian health insurance 
schemes (Sood et al., 2013; Karan et al., 2015) also find little or no impact of these schemes on 
the health expenditure of the poor. A qualification to these conclusions is that there are 
differences between the performance of the national health insurance scheme and various state-
level schemes, with some of the latter doing better (e.g., Rao et al., 2014). 
Implications of health insurance for financial inclusion are brought out significantly in a study by 
Banerjee et al. (2014). In an RCT, SKS the largest MFI in India bundled a health insurance 
component with micro-finance lending. But no one seemed to demand insurance, even people for 
whom there was clearly value. Strikingly, a substantial fraction of clients preferred to let go of 
microfinance rather than pay a moderately higher interest rate and keep their loan, highlighting 
that adverse selection was a moot concern in this setting. One caveat is that the study was 
somewhat confounded by the financial trouble SKS got into by time that the final survey was 
done. In a related study, Islam and Maitra (2012) highlighted the health insurance effect of 
general microcredit. Using a large panel data set from rural Bangladesh, they found that 
households that had access to microcredit do not need to sell livestock in order to insure their 
consumption, when confronted with health shocks that required unexpected expenditures or led 
to lost income. 
Payments Technologies 
Because the poor face high transaction costs, even when using cash (e.g., when trying to save, 
cash may not be a convenient or safe store of value), reducing such costs through technological 
innovations can foster inclusion. There is robust evidence that digital payments technologies 
have positive impacts. Much of this evidence comes from the M-PESA scheme in Kenya (Jack, 
Ray and Suri, 2013; Jack and Suri, 2014): users are able to make more frequent and longer 
distance money transfers, and manage income variability better for smoother consumption 
patterns. In Kenya, the existence of a dominant telecom provider helped, although technological 
                                                 
13 McCord compares schemes for Cambodia, India, Tanzania and Uganda. 
14 Ito and Kono (2010) explain low take up of such schemes in India in terms of behavioral factors such as present 
bias. 
12 
 
limitations in interoperability reduced access for some and stifled competition (Kendall et al., 
2011). In Tanzania (where M-PESA is also available), an interoperability agreement among 
several providers achieved widespread coverage (Bourreau and Valletti, 2015). In other 
countries, telecom companies have provided specific digital services: for example, Orange 
Money (Jordan), enables consumers to pay bills and to make point-of-sale purchases; Smart 
Money (Philippines) and Regalli (Dominican Republic) enable customers to make bill payments. 
There are complex issues of infrastructure, regulatory policies, and even details of user interface 
design that can affect the success of digital financial services (Mas and Morawczynski, 2009; 
Medhi et al., 2009). 
In India, digital payments have been conceptualized as one component of a three-part strategy 
for financial inclusion using digital technologies: JAM, standing for Jan Dhan (banking), 
Aadhaar (identity) and Mobile (transactions). Biometric identity cards in India (Aadhaar) have 
reduced corruption in welfare programs, economized on expenditures and even had some 
positive impacts on outcomes (Banerjee et al., 2016; Muralidharan et al., 2016; Imbert and Papp 
(2015). Other examples of positive impacts from using digital technologies include Afghanistan 
(Callen et al., 2015) and Nigeria (Aker et al., 2014), suggesting that there are replicable 
opportunities for successful innovations. In India, the JAM framework for policy innovation has 
the potential to avoid a common problem in policymaking in that country, of broad and shallow 
interventions. On the other hand, Ravi and Gakhar (2015) make a case for broader scope of 
financial services tied to digital innovation, to take advantage of economies of scope, given the 
fixed costs of infrastructure and adoption.15 
Financial Literacy 
On the demand side, financial literacy is an important factor in shaping financial inclusion. 
Consumers have to understand the nature of the products and services they are buying, as well as 
the implications of these purchases for their welfare. This may be relatively simple in the case of 
payments and transfers, but even bank accounts can present challenges in terms of weighing 
consumption and saving tradeoffs. Insurance products are inherently complicated by the 
difficulties of measuring uncertainty and evaluating risk. These issues are tied in with behavioral 
factors as well – systematic distortions in evaluation and decision-making, but those are 
considered next, somewhat separately. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) provide a theoretical and empirical survey of issues surrounding 
financial literacy, although their empirical evidence is from industrial countries, which also face 
challenges of educating consumers of financial services. In all countries, one basic problem is 
lack of information (Gine et al., 2014, for Mexico), but how information asymmetries are 
overcome can be crucial (Alan et al., 2015, for Turkey). Miller et al. (2014) surveyed evaluations 
of 188 financial education programs, and found weak evidence for positive impacts on financial 
                                                 
15 For example, digital credit is showing some promise for financial inclusion in countries such as India. 
Creditworthiness does not have to be dependent on scanty financial history, but instead can be based on richer 
mobile phone usage history. Recent research suggests that mobile phone usage can predict loan repayment 
(Björkegren & Grissen, 2015). Furthermore, as in the case of microfinance, dynamic incentives (larger loans at 
better terms) encourage repayment of digital loans. I am grateful to Eilin Francis for these points. 
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knowledge, let alone decision-making. However, it appears that teaching simplified guidelines 
for behavior as rules-of-thumb can have a positive impact (Drexler et al., 2014).  
Financial literacy itself can have different dimensions and contexts, and several specific studies 
focus on specific aspects such as household saving or managing a business. For example, Cole et 
al. (2011) use large field surveys in India and Indonesia and RCTs in Indonesia, to show that 
prices of financial services have an effect on demand. However, even though financial literacy is 
an important correlate of using financial services, financial training in the experiments is not an 
effective or cost efficient tool for promoting the use of bank accounts. In a business context, De 
Mel et al. (2014) conducted an RCT among low-income women in urban Sri Lanka to measure 
the impact of the most commonly used business training course in developing countries. They 
tried two treatments – training only and training plus a cash grant – over two years. Training 
alone changed business practices but had no impact on business profits, sales or capital stock. 
The grant plus training combination increased business profitability in the first eight months but 
this impact also dissipated in the second year. However, there was some evidence that training 
might be more effective for new owners. Karlan and Valdivia (2011) conducted an RCT in Peru 
to measure marginal impact of adding business training to a Peruvian group lending program 
(MFI) for female micro-entrepreneurs. Training had no effect on business revenue, profits, or 
employment, but there were business knowledge improvements among the entrepreneurs, and 
increased client retention rates for the MFI. 
Behavioral Factors 
Because financial services involve complexities with respect to intertemporal tradeoffs and 
judgments about uncertainty and risk, they are most subject to what economists characterize as 
behavioral factors, namely, various (mostly systematic) deviations from the ideal of economic 
rationality. Note that some of these factors are hard to disentangle from lack of information, and 
financial literacy considerations overlap with behavioral factors. 
An important basic example of a behavioral bias is the difficulty that individuals have in 
committing to a savings strategy that they realize will be optimal for them over time. (Ashraf et 
al., 2006, 2010) tested commitment savings products in the Philippines. These products have 
lock-in periods or penalties for early withdrawal that “commit” the individual to the savings 
goal. Women who were offered an individually-held commitment savings account reported 
increased decision-making power, and durable goods purchases shifted towards “female-
oriented” goods, such as kitchen appliances. Those who used the commitment devices had 
significantly higher savings. In Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013) tested a simple “Safe Box” 
that allowed users to save for preventive or emergency health, and this significantly increased 
achievement of health savings goals. In an experiment in Uganda, primary school students were 
offered a “softer” commitment device, (funds in the savings account were available for 
withdrawal but labeled as being “for education”), and combined with a parental outreach 
program this increased spending on school supplies and improved test scores (Karlan and 
Linden, 2016). 
14 
 
A range of other behavioral phenomena have been examined in the context of financial 
inclusion. For example, Duflo et al. (2011) show that many farmers in Western Kenya  
fail to take advantage of apparently profitable fertilizer investments, apparently due to a 
combination of procrastination and new consumption opportunities, but they do invest in  
response to small, time-limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer, such as free delivery. 
Studies such as Beaman et al. (2014), Dupas and Robinson (2014), and Kremer et al. (2015) 
show that various types of small business owners in Kenya make inefficient (profit-reducing) 
decisions with respect to keeping enough change, hours and days worked, and inventory 
management. There are a growing number of studies in this vein, and they intersect with studies 
examining the design and impacts of microcredit schemes. 
 
Recent Studies for India 
The overview in the previous section, while examining a relatively small number of studies of 
financial inclusion in developing countries, still provides a sense of the multidimensionality and 
complexity of financial inclusion, and the challenges of promoting any aspect of financial 
inclusion through policy and technology innovations. Important considerations that emerge from 
the overview are the significance of social and economic context, the need to consider behavioral 
biases connected to situations involving time and risk, the interaction of different dimensions of 
financial inclusion, the importance of details of policy design, and the limited understanding we 
still have of many of the factors underlying the functioning of financial markets. This section 
considers several recent studies for India, all of which represent detailed research into important 
facets of financial inclusion.16  
Financial Inclusion 
As noted in the previous section, detailed economy-wide data pertaining to financial inclusion 
tends to be studied for richer, developed countries (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). This situation 
has begun to change for India. In particular, Badarinza et al. (2017) use a major household 
survey to provide a cross-sectional picture of both the asset and liability sides of household 
balance sheets in India.17 The authors document that, in India, lower proportions of younger 
households hold financial assets, even compared to China, let alone developed countries. Other 
striking features of the Indian household financial landscape are that households do not reduce 
real estate holdings as they cross retirement age, there is no drop off in mortgage loan 
participation at these ages, and unsecured debt is more significant in all age groups. Similar 
differences are reflected in comparisons across the wealth distribution. Savings in retirement 
account are nearly absent. The authors document the high reliance on gold as a form of savings, 
the lack of access to bank branches as a constraint to financial savings, striking regional 
variations, and the importance of education in supporting higher use of financial savings. 
                                                 
16 Almost all the studies considered in this section are IGC-sponsored projects. 
17 The data is from the June 2012, All India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS) conducted by the NSSO, with 
over 100,000 households sampled. 
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Badarinza et al. provide an important overview of India’s household financial landscape. 
Another significant study (Campbell et al., 2012) looks in detail at India’s mortgage market. As 
indicated from the household survey, Indians’ use of mortgages for housing is quite limited. The 
authors focus on the impacts of regulation of the mortgage market, providing an important case 
study of the impacts of national-level policymaking on financial inclusion. They analyze 
administrative data on over one million loans originated by an Indian mortgage provider, 
examining loan pricing and default rates. The period they examine is one in which the 
availability of mortgages was increasing fairly rapidly, but so was regulation of the market. 
Lending to small borrowers is an important aspect of financial inclusion in the context of the 
housing market, and the data do indicate that regulatory changes designed to promote this goal 
were successful. On the other hand, there was a spike in defaults, indicating the possible costs of 
policies that neglect the capacity and incentives of market participants. On the positive side, 
however, the data suggest that mortgage lenders were able to learn from the experience of 
surging defaults, and price risks more accurately in subsequent years.  
The lessons of this study are potentially generalizable. Policies designed to support goals of 
financial inclusion require careful attention to market structure, incentives of market participants, 
and learning and adjustment through ongoing analysis of market data. Private profit-making 
entities have incentives to engage in the latter, but their behavior ought not to be overly distorted 
by the regulatory structure: regulations have to balance risks and efficiency against equity-
enhancing goals of financial inclusion. A caveat to these general observations is the obvious one 
that each market and each financial inclusion dimension requires separate, detailed analysis. 
Banking 
Despite some less-than-positive studies, the evidence from research in a number of countries, 
including India, suggests that there are mechanisms that can bring down the cost of access to 
formal banking for poor households, and thereby improve their savings strategies. In India, there 
has been a massive, nationwide effort to achieve banking access for vast numbers of the 
country’s poorer citizens – the Jan Dhan part of JAM (discussed in the context of digital 
payments). While technology is an important part of facilitating access and maintenance of bank 
accounts, making these accounts more useful to small account holders is important for long-run 
sustainability.18 Bank operations and everyday practices in India have the potential for 
improvement (see Singh, 2015 for a brief discussion of some studies of credit risk management 
in Indian banks).   
Cole et al. (2015) tackle the important issue of bank lending through an experiment with 
commercial bank loan officers in India. This was a high-stakes filed experiment, providing the 
subjects with tangible incentives. The loan officers in the study were paid to review and assess 
over 14,000 actual (but previously processed) loan applications. They were provided with 
different kinds of exogenous incentive schemes, and, while the subjects did not know how the 
                                                 
18 Indeed, in India access to bank accounts is perhaps easier than in many other developing countries, because of the 
creation or existence of no-frills type accounts and post office accounts. Arguably, therefore, this aspect of financial 
inclusion in India has moved beyond access to basic accounts to access to useful services and products. 
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loans had performed, this information was available to the researchers. The study permits a very 
“clean” test of how performance compensation affects risk-assessment and lending in a banking 
environment. The results indicated that high-powered incentives do lead to greater screening 
effort, separating “good” from “bad” borrowers, and to more profitable lending decisions. 
However, typical features of loan officer compensation contracts such as deferred compensation 
and limited liability, toned down the incentive effects. The study also found that career concerns 
and some personality traits affected loan officer behavior. On the other hand, the impact of 
incentive schemes did not vary with personality traits such as risk-aversion, optimism or 
overconfidence. There was also evidence that incentive contracts had the potential to distort the 
assessment of credit risk, even among trained and experienced professionals. 
Performance incentives are important across all kinds of organizations, but areas such as bank 
lending are particularly important in the context of India’s financial inclusion goals. Expanding 
banking without improving the performance of bank employees, particularly those who make 
lending decisions that can lead to productive investment and job creation, can be a significantly 
suboptimal strategy, and the Cole et al. study provides a baseline for efforts to improve the way 
in which loan officers in Indian banks are incentivized. 
A different approach to improving the performance of conventional banks is the creation of 
alternative kinds of banking institutions. Rural cooperative banks do have a long history in India, 
but have been subject to political capture. Another alternative is the model represented by India’s 
Shri Mahil Self Employment Women Association Sahkari (SEWA) Bank, the oldest women’s 
bank in the world. Targeting women represents a vital aspect of financial inclusion since women 
at any income level (but especially poorer ones) are less likely to have financial autonomy and 
access to financial services than their male counterparts. Field et al. (2016) use data on the 
expansion of the SEWA Bank to examine the impact of access to microfinance on women’s 
labor force participation. Interestingly, this data pertains to urban settings, so the distance or 
scarcity aspects of constraints to financial access are not salient. The authors motivate their study 
by noting the much lower participation of women rather than men in the labor force, and 
hypothesize that “access to microfinance is key to bridge the gap and to introduce women into 
the labor force.” Their study is the first to provide a rigorous empirical evaluation of long run 
impacts of increased access to microcredit on female labor force participation.  
Beginning in 1999 onward, SEWA Bank began a major expansion of the number of loan 
collection officers they employed. This significantly reduced the transaction cost of getting a 
loan in Ahmedabad, Gujarat’s capital and largest city, and thereby increased access for many 
women to microloans. The authors’ results do indeed indicate that access to such loans helped 
integrate women into the labor force over a period of several years. In addition, this effect was 
driven by greater participation of women in household business activity, although not necessarily 
a sustainable change in female empowerment, since the share of household income produced by 
women increased but with a diminishing effect over time. An intriguing effect in the data was a 
reduction in fertility associated with increasing participation in the labor force. While some of 
these impacts require further empirical studies, this particular analysis hints at the importance of 
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financial inclusion for a range of social and economic outcomes pertaining to the status and 
welfare of women in India. 
Microcredit/Microfinance 
As described earlier, there is a very large literature on microfinance in developing countries, with 
a range of results in terms of the effectiveness and impacts of various such efforts. Clearly, the 
details matter. Two recent studies for India provide careful analysis of the impacts of certain 
contractual features in microcredit. Field et al. (2013) conducted an RCT that compared a 
standard microcredit contract, requiring repayment to begin immediately after the disbursement 
of the loan, to an alternative contractual setup that included a two-month grace period. The study 
found that providing a grace period increased short-run business investment as well as long-run 
profits but doing so also raised default rates. These results suggest that microcredit contracts that 
require early repayment discourage illiquid risky investment. There are costs to relaxing this 
constraint because of higher default rates (associated with greater adverse selection as well as 
moral hazard) , but the authors do some initial calculations that suggest that the net welfare 
impacts of subsidizing microfinance institutions to be able to withstand higher default rates 
might be positive. These welfare gains would be realized through higher microenterprise growth 
and greater reductions in household poverty. This is an important finding that takes the policy 
discussion beyond whether microfinance works or doesn’t work, to the specifics of contract 
design for maximizing the potential benefits of this form of financial inclusion. 
Another study (Barboni, 2016) also tackles the issue of contractual design in microfinance, 
focusing as well on repayment flexibility. A theoretical model of adverse selection predicts that 
lenders can achieve higher profits by offering a menu of choices which include rigid and flexible 
repayment schedules, instead of just the standard rigid contract. Borrowers in this case can select 
from the menu. A set of in-the-field experimental games conducted with Indian micro-
entrepreneurs, in which they were offered both a flexible and a rigid repayment schedule and 
where the price of the flexible schedule was varied, showed that more entrepreneurial borrowers 
were more likely to take-up the flexible contract than less entrepreneurial ones. This separation 
was even more pronounced when the flexible schedule was costlier relative to the rigid contract. 
More risk-averse borrowers, on the other hand, were more likely to choose the rigid contract 
when it was less costly than the flexible contract. The author’s estimates also suggest that 
offering a menu of contracts can be more profitable than the standard, rigid microfinance 
contract. Hence, this analysis further extends the possibilities raised in Field et al. (2013), where 
attention was restricted to an either-or choice between two types of contracts, rather than the 
menu possibility considered by Barboni. Barboni and Agarwal (2017) are currently extending 
this analysis to include more detailed data on microenterprise investment decisions and 
performance associated with different types of contracts and borrowers, with the potential of 
further refining microfinance models for practical application.  
Small Firm Finance 
In the previous section, several studies, including De and Singh (2014) for India, were discussed, 
illustrating the credit constraints faced by small firms. To put this issue in context for India, there 
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is considerable evidence that, while liberalization and economic reform beginning in 1991 led to 
new entry of firms, more recently, industrial dynamism has stalled (Alfaro and Chari, 2009, 
2014): “[T]here is a hollowing out of the middle of the size distribution that can be characterized 
as the “shrinking middle” in Indian manufacturing and points to constraints that small- and 
medium-sized firms may continue to face in their attempts to grow” (Alfaro and Chari, 2014). 
There are a variety of factors constraining growth of smaller firms, but finance is certainly one of 
them (Allen et al., 2007; Shukla, 2015). These earlier studies have not, however, established 
clear causal linkages. 
A study by Raj and Sen (2013) fills the gap, providing an important empirical analysis of very 
small family firms in India – which are the predominant type of firm in the informal sector – and 
the role of finance constraints in preventing them from transitioning to larger firms that employ 
non-family labor. The authors use a rich data-set based on unit level data drawn from the 
national surveys of informal manufacturing by the NSSO. They supplement their unit level 
analysis with panel data analysis of 364 districts estimating the effects of financial development 
on firm transition at the district level. Raj and Sen present strong evidence that finance 
constraints play an important role in firm transition from family-labor-only firms to small firms 
that use hired labor, but even more so for the growth of the latter beyond six workers. They find 
that firm capabilities matter as well, for example, firms that maintain formal accounts are more 
likely to make the transition than firms that do not. There are many other factors that affect 
transition and growth, including working as sub-contractors, having access to electricity, being  
located in an urban area, and being in a district with higher levels of human capital. An important 
result of the analysis is that government assistance, such as loans, training, and marketing, does 
not help firms transition and grow, suggesting that policymaking may be more effective in 
focusing on relaxing financing and other constraints for small, informal sector firms. 
Agricultural Credit 
As alluded to in the previous section, farm credit in India is a contentious and politically charged 
policy area. Loans can be subsidized and forgiven, but small farmers may still often face 
substantial financial distress. Maitra et al. (2014) provide an important study exploring an 
alternative approach to credit for small farmers. In this study, randomly selected villages in West 
Bengal state in India participated in a field experiment with an innovative variant of microcredit, 
trader-agent intermediated lending (TRAIL). In this program, borrowers of individual liability 
loans in some villages (all small farmers) were selected by local trader-lender agents. These 
agents received incentives in the form of repayment-based commissions. In other villages, small 
farmers had access to a more conventional group-based lending program (GBL). In this 
experiment, TRAIL loans did much better than GBL loans in increasing production of the 
leading cash crop and farm incomes. According to the analysis, the underlying mechanism for 
this result included the fact that borrowers selected by TRAIL agents were more able farmers 
than those who self-selected into the GBL scheme, although this pattern of selection did not 
completely explain the observed difference in income impacts. An important implication of this 
work is that it points out a possibility for leveraging existing institutions or expertise, somewhat 
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similar to how ITC used existing commission agents to facilitate its Internet-based e-choupal 
procurement scheme (Goyal, 2010). 
A study by Mitra et al. (2012) also has some indirect implications for agricultural credit policy 
for small farmers. In much of India, small farmers do not sell directly to large buyers, but rely on 
intermediaries: credit constraints are one factor in this market structure, as are asymmetries of 
information. This study provides a detailed analysis of how potato farmers in West Bengal sell 
their crop to local traders, including how prices and intermediary margins are determined. In the 
study, small farmers in randomly chosen villages were provided information about daily 
wholesale prices, either publicly or privately. The evidence of impacts of these interventions did 
not support the idea that risk was being shared between farmers and traders, but was consistent 
with small farmers having limited alternatives for selling their produce, making price 
information of little value. More specifically, providing farmers with access to market price 
information to reduce their informational asymmetry vis-à-vis traders did not have a significant 
average impact on farmgate prices, while raising pass-through of wholesale market prices to 
farmgate prices. This was a consequence of the lack of access of these West Bengal farmers to 
direct sale in wholesale markets. While the study does not specifically deal with credit 
constraints, one possibility is that easing credit constraints for small farmers, so that they have to 
rely less on trade credit from intermediaries, could improve their bargaining power and increase 
the value of price information for farmers.  
Farmers’ Insurance 
As discussed in the previous section, agricultural insurance products for small farmers are 
challenging to implement. On top of being income constrained, farmers lack experience with 
such insurance, financial literacy, and general education. Gaurav et al. (2011) conducted a field 
experiment (RCT) involving different methods of marketing rainfall insurance to 600 small-scale 
farmers in Gujarat, India. Financial education (specifically, a customized financial literacy and 
insurance education module) had a positive effect on rainfall insurance adoption, but only one 
marketing intervention, a money-back guarantee, had a consistent and large effect on farmers’ 
purchase decisions. This result suggests that farmers do not have the experience to be able to 
trust the new insurance product, and the guarantee mitigates their risk perceptions. While such 
guarantees are uncommon or absent for insurance in mature markets, the use of money-back 
guarantees for various kinds of products is widespread, especially where the product is novel or 
the seller is not trusted. 
A major research project (Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2013, which summarizes three other 
research papers) examines the interaction between informal risk sharing, index insurance and 
risk-taking using a large scale RCT. The authors randomized offerings of rainfall insurance 
contracts to cultivating and landless households in a set of Indian villages.  According to the 
authors, census data on caste networks permitted characterization of the nature and extent of 
informal risk sharing before the contracts were offered. The authors uncovered several 
interesting phenomena: (1) informal group-level risk sharing had the potential to make up for 
weaknesses in weather index insurance, and increase the demand for such index insurance; (2) 
index insurance had the potential to do better than informal indemnification in incentivizing 
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farmers to invest in riskier technologies with higher average returns; and (3) offering insurance 
contracts to cultivators could lead to increased risk-taking, and to increased risk exposure of 
agricultural laborers, making the latter more likely to purchase weather insurance themselves 
when aware of this possible effect. This study can provide important guidance for the design of 
weather insurance at a regional scale, and ultimately for policymakers seeking to achieve 
widespread adoption of such insurance, making it more sustainable – the inclusion of landless 
laborers represents an important innovation in potentially enhancing both sustainability and 
inclusion. 
Health Insurance 
Health care is a credence good, relying on trust concerning provider quality. In such cases, 
referrals through social networks can be very important. These issues are compounded when new 
health insurance products involve using new or untrusted providers – say a private doctor versus 
a government doctor. Two recent studies examine aspects of these social network effects in the 
context of health insurance in India. Berg et al. (2012) study how incentive pay and social 
distance interact in the process of disseminating information about India’s RSBY public health 
insurance program. Using a theoretical model in which individuals have pro-social objectives, 
but also differential preferences with respect to dealing with different social groups the study 
analyzes data from a large-scale RCT conducted in South India. The experiment involved hiring 
local agents to disseminate information about the insurance program. These agents were paid 
either a flat fee or a variable rate that depended on the subsequently measured level of 
knowledge about the program in the eligible population. Interestingly, it was found that incentive 
pay improved knowledge transmission to households that were socially distant from the agent, 
but not to socially similar households. 
Debnath and Jain (2015) directly examined the role of caste networks within villages or urban 
wards, in affecting utilization of Aarogyasri, Andhra Pradesh’s state-level publicly financed 
health insurance program. The authors hypothesized that local caste networks could play a vital 
role in transmitting various kinds of information about the program and the available health care 
providers, as well as signaling that using formal healthcare through the program was socially 
acceptable or appropriate. Using administrative data on program claims the study estimated that 
a unit increase in Aarogyasri use and associated claim amounts in the same caste and village 
increased first-time claims in the same group by 19 percent and first-time claim amounts by 16 
percent in the subsequent quarter. On the other hand, the behavior of other castes inside or 
outside the village, or same caste peers outside the village in the same sub-district, had no 
significant effect on program utilization. 
Given the potentially transformative impacts of RSBY, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of how the national insurance program affects healthcare usage, health 
expenditure and health status. Conducting detailed impact evaluations of government programs 
has been a relatively weak spot in India, and an ongoing project by Malani et al. (2016) 
represents a significant research effort. These authors initially focus on survey design, another 
difficulty in measuring health care outcomes due to the complexity of the services and problems 
of recall. Preliminary results identify areas where recall may be a problem, leading to 
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improvements in survey design: these improvements may be useful for future government-
sponsored surveys as well. 
Financial Literacy 
The discussion in the previous section indicated the broad scope of the term “financial literacy,” 
and the range of approaches that might be used to increase this capability among consumers and 
entrepreneurs. A very basic and minimal approach is to require disclosure of certain 
characteristics and prices of financial products or services. Halan and Sane (2017) evaluate the 
effectiveness of disclosures in the context of the insurance market in India, focusing on a specific 
life insurance product. They presented product advertisements to customers with four different 
sets of disclosures: basic information, the actual rate of return on the product in addition to the 
first set, a benchmark return of a similar product in addition to the second set, and product 
features of a more cost-effective alternative life insurance product in addition to the third set. 
Participants in each case were asked to provide assessments of the product and hypothetical 
purchase decisions. The results suggest that consumers may lose focus with “too much” 
information, and that information is more likely to be valuable if understandable in the context of 
prior financial literacy, highlighting again the complexity of making financial innovation work to 
the benefit of inexperienced consumers.19  
Behavioral Factors 
Behavioral factors in the demand for financial services center on how individuals perceive 
intertemporal tradeoffs and degrees of risk and uncertainty. However, as the overview in the 
previous section and discussion of other studies in this section both indicate, social factors are 
pervasive in India, and behavioral considerations arising from these can matter for the diffusion 
and adoption of new financial services. Understanding these social factors can come from other 
contexts. For example, Gangadharan et al. (2014) analyze the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project 
(JEEViKA), a community driven poverty reduction program which aims to improve the social 
and economic empowerment of the rural poor. While the study is not focused on financial 
services, its lessons may be useful in contexts of innovating in financial inclusion products. The 
question in this study was whether community participatory design can allow local leaders to 
expropriate resources. The study examines differences in the behavior of male and female leaders 
in JEEViKA and non-JEEViKA villages in a field experiment. Using a measure of dishonesty as 
a proxy for “elite capture,” female leaders seemed to be more deceptive in JEEViKA villages as 
compared to non-JEEViKA villages. But participants from JEEViKA villages appeared to be 
more trusting, especially those targeted by the program. There are complicated implications for 
various aspects of trust, and the results need to be compared with those for other types of efforts 
such as SEWA Bank, or farmers’ insurance, for guidelines on creating efficient and durable 
institutions for financial inclusion. 
                                                 
19 An earlier study (Halan and Sane, 2016) had used an audit methodology to collect data and found evidence of 
“mis-selling” of tax-advantaged savings and insurance products by Indian banks. The authors also highlight the 
tendency of sellers not to engage in voluntary disclosure of product characteristics. 
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Lessons and Conclusions  
Financial inclusion is a complex and multidimensional concept. This paper has focused on 
decomposing financial inclusion into the provision of more specific financial services, and 
examining the empirical evidence for how well different components of financial inclusion can 
be accomplished, and the methods that might work in specific contexts. While the evidence for 
different countries and programs can be variable and mixed, as suggested by the overview in the 
second section of this paper, the discussion of recent studies for India indicates that well-
designed and implemented research studies can provide clear answers for Indian contexts, for a 
range of aspects of financial inclusion. Hence, one of the lessons of this paper is that careful 
empirical research can guide policy design in India for financial inclusion. Furthermore, there are 
still areas where our knowledge is limited or uncertain, and further empirical research can be 
directly beneficial for policy design. 
Turning to more specific conclusions and lessons, we begin with the previous surveys discussed 
in the introduction. Karlan and Morduch (2009) emphasize the shift from postulating 
hypothetical improvements in financial access to concrete lessons from experiments, pilots and 
trials in actual field settings. According to them, “The design of products (including their prices, 
term structure, flexibility, and marketing) affects adoption and usage—and ultimately economic 
and social impacts. … Much of the new work described above involves researchers creating 
partnerships with existing financial providers, both commercial banks and public or non-profit 
institutions. The partnerships generally center on testing the effects of systematically varying 
delivery mechanisms or introducing new services. The lessons are thus not hypothetical but are 
based on actual products delivered by actual institutions.” 
Aggarwal and Klepper (2013) emphasize how government policy changes can relax existing 
constraints to financial inclusion, especially with respect to savings, payments and financial 
literacy. In assessing what can or may work, they draw on a variety of sources of evidence, 
including field experiments, but also administrative data (including “natural experiments” from 
policy changes) and surveys. In fact, they list two dozen examples of policy innovations from 
across the world (see their Appendix A), including reforms that encourage private innovation as 
well as direct government actions. Echoing Karlan and Morduch, they conclude that “For 
financial inclusion efforts to be successful, policy-design must be tailored to the systemic failure 
in each setting.” As an example, they suggest remote rural populations may benefit the most 
from overcoming distance barriers (perhaps by allowing banking correspondents) whereas the 
urban poor may need relaxed documentation requirements. 
Karlan et al. (2016) emphasize the positive evidence for the benefits of savings products and 
digital payments, and generally view digital technology as opening up new possibilities for 
reducing transaction costs, information asymmetries and market distortions. They suggest that 
microcredit and insurance present greater challenges, as do social norms that can disadvantage 
women, in particular. They also highlight issues of scaling up (including for digital efforts), 
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offering integrated or complementary services, and linking financial inclusion to end goals such 
as health and education. 
Many of the lessons of the three surveys include examples from India, and the IGC-sponsored 
studies in this paper add to this India-related evidence. Much of recent Indian policy making with 
respect to financial inclusion can be seen to be consistent with the direction supported by current 
research-based knowledge. For example, this includes government-led pushes to increases access 
to banking, insurance and digital payments. At the same time, some of the new studies indicate 
the need for further research. Cole et al. (2015) and Field et al. (2016) both, in very different 
contexts, highlight the importance of organizational innovations that improve incentives within 
the banking sector. This suggests that simply expanding the number of bank accounts may not be 
an optimal policy (see footnote 18). At the same time, organizational changes are delicate 
matters and need to be context specific. Hence, this is possibly an area for further research, 
including pilots of innovation possibilities as well as analysis of administrative data. 
In areas such as microcredit and small firm finance, the studies by Field et al. (2013), Raj and 
Sen (2013) and Barboni (2016) suggest that there is still much to learn in the Indian context 
about the specifics of relaxing financing constraints for small entrepreneurs, ranging from 
microenterprises to more substantial small and even medium firms. Issues of contract design, 
monitoring and enforcement, and training do not seem to be completely understood in the Indian 
context. In some cases, there is more detailed evidence for other countries, but the transferability 
of those lessons to India – indeed, even to specific Indian states – needs to be tested. There is 
also an obvious connection to issues of how the Indian banking sector functions on the side of 
making loans, in addition to the savings opportunities it offers. This relates back to the point 
about integration of different aspects of financial inclusion noted by Karlan et al. (2016). 
The areas of agricultural credit and farmers’ insurance are another example of the need for an 
integrated approach to financial inclusion initiatives. Gaurav et al. (2011) and Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig (2013) provide newer evidence for India on how to design agricultural insurance 
that is more inclusive and sustainable, including issues of promoting adoption and inclusion 
(such as extending it to agricultural laborers and not just farmers). However, given variations in 
agricultural conditions around a large country such as India, as well as differences in income 
levels, further studies can solidify the design of appropriate insurance products, as well as 
examine their integration with access to agricultural credit, market access (as highlighted in the 
studies by Mitra et al., 2012 and Maitra et al., 2014) and productive investment. With respect to 
the latter, a study such as the one conducted by Karlan et al. (2014) for Ghana, that explores the 
link between access to agricultural insurance and investment, could usefully be done for India. In 
general, more studies for India, whether based on field experiments or administrative data, that 
establish links between specific policies for financial inclusion and outcomes such as investment 
or productivity (in non-agricultural as well as agricultural settings) would provide guidance for 
policymakers.  
Health insurance is another area where Indian policymaking has been innovative in ways that 
seek to promote inclusion. In this case, the potential link between financial inclusion and 
outcomes ought to be very direct, but the evidence is still being gathered. The ongoing study by 
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Malani et al. (2016) will be a significant contribution, but may need to be expanded. Earlier 
studies by Berg et al. (2012) and Debnath and Jain (2015) represent useful investigations of the 
processes that drive acceptance and adoption of such innovations as health insurance, which are 
obvious preconditions for achieving inclusion and positive impacts on health outcomes. 
Finally, the size of India’s market and the diversity of areas of possible innovations in financial 
products and services, are strongly indicative of the need to conduct further studies of patterns of 
household financial behavior. Badarinza et al. (2017), though not an IGC-sponsored project, is a 
good example of preliminary work on documenting these patterns, but much more needs to be 
done. Campbell et al. (2012) conducted a useful study of India’s mortgage market, and the plan 
in the latest Union Budget to expand low income housing will increase the need for further such 
studies that emphasize financial inclusion. Complementing the understanding of specific markets 
for financial products and services, a much better understanding of financial literacy and 
effective methods for imparting financial education to consumers and small entrepreneurs is 
required in the Indian context. The study by Halan and Sane (2017) represents just a small slice 
of what policymakers and financial sector providers need to know about the potential behavior of 
individuals as innovations are designed and implemented. In all of these cases, collaborations 
and coordination between policymakers, practitioners and researchers can be vital in achieving 
financial inclusion in multiple dimensions, making sure that this is done efficiently, and 
connecting financial inclusion to positive outcomes in health, education, productivity and 
employment. 
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